

## Looking at corp.com as a proxy for .corp



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#### **Concerns about name collisions**




- ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) (among others) had expressed concerns:
  - SAC 045 (2010) Invalid Top Level Domain Queries at the Root Level
  - ♦ SAC 057 (2013) SSAC Advisory on Internal Name Certificates
- ICANN engaged Interisle to study name collisions
  - Start mid May 2013
  - Draft report end June 2013 for ICANN meeting in Durban
  - ICANN published "Name Collision in the DNS" report

#### Assessing risk of name collisions



- Risk comprises two variables:
  - 1. Probability of occurrence
    - Primary focus of the Interisle study
  - 2. Severity of consequences
    - Magnitude/cost of consequences
    - Who would be harmed
    - Cost of remediation
    - Responsibility for remediation
    - Capability of remediating parties




## The corp.com domain



- Mikey O'Connor registered corp.com in 1994
- No subdomains registered
- But he was seeing a lot of DNS queries
- Could we learn anything about TLD name collisions using corp.com?
- Advantage: corp.com was already delegated
- Initial short study sponsored by Mikey and NetChoice
- Configured DNS for corp.com to monitor query logs

# DNS queries per day to corp.com





#### What we found



- Queries from
  - → ~300,000 IP addresses in ~30,000 subnets
  - Using ~14,000 AS numbers
  - Across >200 countries
- Predominantly from large resolvers, including:




















#### **Nearly 6 million distinct 3LDs**



msdcs win co bend ce wpad accent tsi \_sites trx alv gbp invsfoxepo01 ns1 ns2 bqc gek ati bqa usfxbinvscm01pv mwp cbt mexichem isatap sms\_slp invshouxchmbx04 usrenalcare bluerhino invsfoxxchmbx02 invshouxchpub01 invsfoxxchmbx01 invsfoxxchpub01 invshouxchmbx03 invsfoxepo02v invsfoxwdc01 bgeu dedussrvfil001 invscopweb01 rumosiomfil01pp egcaisrvfil002 ctlman0012 skbrasrvfil001 invsfoxwdc02 inchnsrvapp008 invspdascm01 invsfoxwdc03 ctlmonhpdm01v twkhhsrvfile002 delimiomfil01pp pleurtycfs01 ips-sol07







QTYPEs	%
Α	58%
SOA	22%
SRV	16%
AAAA	2%
MX	1%
NS	0%
PTR	0%
TXT	0%
ANY	0%
SPF	0%
CNAME	0%
DS	0%
A6	0%
DNSKEY	0%

#### **Predominant query patterns**



3LD.cor	p.com	~50%
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QTYPE = SOA ~20% (from ~60% of addresses)

Underscore ~20%

 $QTYPE = SRV \sim 15\%$ 

Chrome ~ 5% (from ~10% of addresses)

wpad...corp.com ~ 3% (from ~10% of addresses)

QTYPE = MX ~ 1% (from ~35% of addresses)

isatap...corp.com ~ 1%

## Deconstructing 'underscore' patterns



SIP: \_sip...

XMPP: \_xmpp...

Apple's Bonjour: ...\_dns-sd...


Active Directory: \_sites \_gc \_dc \_pdc (~15%)

Other uses of underscore – but lower query volume sms\_... \_vlmcs... nlb\_... mp\_...

## **Active Directory example**



- benq.corp.com
- Most AD traffic through a Taiwan telecom ISP
- >400 queries per hour to the same DNS names
- Not all from one IP address
- But we do see repeated queries
- Apparently, AD cannot take "no" (non-existent domain) for an answer



#### **QNAMEs for two QTYPEs**



<b>MX</b> ~1% queries ~29k QNAMEs		
corp.com	15.3%	
mitsubishi.corp.com	1.7%	
sp.corp.com	1.4%	
accuride.corp.com	1.3%	
ioa.corp.com	1.2%	
cabot.corp.com	1.2%	
urs.corp.com	1.1%	
idex.corp.com	1.0%	
asn.corp.com	0.9%	
idg.corp.com	0.9%	

<b>SOA</b> ~20% queries ~40k QNAMEs		
corp.com	21.2%	
ctlply0417.corp.com	1.0%	
win.corp.com	0.7%	
wrsabneh3732.corp.com	0.6%	
egcaiiom6ytj2l.corp.com	0.5%	
alvmnrlt0249.alv.corp.com	0.5%	
xp076596.win.corp.com	0.5%	
fact01.corp.com	0.4%	
invshq00763l.corp.com	0.4%	
ushouiom01710l.corp.com	0.4%	

## **QNAMEs** for two patterns



wpad ~3% queries ~700 QNAMEs		
wpad.corp.com	52.7%	
wpad.benq.corp.com	4.2%	
wpad.accent.corp.com	3.3%	
wpad.win.corp.com	2.9%	
wpad.bluerhino.corp.com	2.0%	
wpad.tsi.corp.com	1.9%	
wpad.wm.corp.com	1.8%	
wpad.bqa.corp.com	1.8%	
wpad.trx.corp.com	1.7%	
wpad.dmz.trx.corp.com	1.6%	

<b>isatap</b> ~1% queries ~650 QNAMEs		
isatap.corp.com	40.8%	
isatap.benq.corp.com	7.6%	
isatap.accent.corp.com	4.6%	
isatap.win.corp.com	3.6%	
isatap.tsi.corp.com	3.1%	
isatap.bqa.corp.com	2.9%	
isatap.wm.corp.com	2.2%	
isatap.usrenalcare.corp.com	2.1%	
isatap.bluerhino.corp.com	2.0%	
isatap.bqc.corp.com	1.9%	

## Trying to contact one affected user



- The string "usrenalcare" appears in ~1% of queries
- >5k IP addresses
- Is it US Renal Care?
- Contact attempts
  - ♦ Email using WHOIS
    - no reply
  - Phone from WHOIS
    - voicemail, no reply



En español MENU

#### Mission

Our Mission at U.S. Renal Care is simple: to be the highest quality provider available to patients with chronic and acute renal disease. We accomplish this mission by partnering with the best Nephrologists in the country, by providing the best trained professional staff in our centers, by offering state of the art technology and by constantly educating patients and family about the disease process. The result is excellent patient outcomes and the best service available.

#### U.S. Renal Care stands out above other providers by:

- Being patient-focused
   Patients are our focus, and we do our best to provide compassionate care, where and when patients need it.
- Partnering with leading physicians
   We work with quality physicians, who provide quality care to patients and also lead our facilities through joint venture partnerships.
- Committing to the communities we call home

#### **Contacting ISP customers**



- "Customer" should be easier than a cold call?
- Identifying a customer takes time
- Finding the right contact at a company takes time
- Explaining observed DNS queries and TLDs is tricky
- Results:
  - Thank you for telling us
  - It was a guest network over which we have no control
  - We've fixed it (but we won't tell you how it happened)

#### What the ISP saw



- An ISP, or other organisation, can determine potential name collisions from DNS query logs
- Locating the source of those queries can be problematic
  - ♦ DNS log (at an ISP resolver or root) shows an IP address, but...
  - ♦ An IP address can be DHCP-assigned e.g., cyber-café
  - The IP address might be that of another DNS server
  - ◆ Timestamp basis may vary in different logs
  - ♦ The IP address may not be from the ISP's customers

## Identifying a name collision



- How will users know that the problem they're experiencing is a result of a new TLD?
- Will a support group be able to diagnose a name collision from reported symptom(s)?
- Will a collision-based security hole be detectable?
- Most users won't recognize a name collision problem
- Companies are not highly motivated to explore mitigation strategies

## ISPs role in supporting customers



- For an ISP or similar organisation
  - They're between a rock and a hard place
  - Between their customers and the new TLDs.
  - They may be the first line of support

- But are ISPs prepared?
  - Will support staff be trained?
  - Will they have the knowledge and expertise to help users?

#### Where does that leave 'users'?



- Choice 1 the user is responsible
  - They should not have used those TLDs
  - They are responsible for fixing their problem
- Choice 2 the user needs information and help
  - ♦ Those who created the problem may no longer be around
  - Current people may not have the requisite knowledge/skills
    - To diagnose problems resulting from name collisions
    - To resolve the problems
    - It could be vendor software

#### **Outreach approaches**



- The pull model
  - Provide information for users to find and retrieve

- The push model
  - Provide information to users
  - Before delegation notification of potential problems
  - After delegation resolving observed problems

#### **Call for action**



- New TLDs are already delegated
- Users may not be adequately prepared
- Augment the ICANN "outreach" activities
- Prepare ISP support organisations
  - Develop specific outreach materials for ISP customers
  - Develop training materials for ISP support staff





# **Questions?**